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Putting Victims First? A Critique of Coalition Anti-Social Behaviour Policy  
 
Abstract  
Anti-social behaviour (ASB) policy was not pursued by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
Coalition Government with the same vigour as their New Labour predecessors. Where 
developments did take place a clear shift in emphasis was apparent, with the needs of ASB 
victims elevated to the forefront of policy. This paper critically appraises two major 
developments that showcase the CoalitioŶ GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s attempts to overhaul ASB policy to 
'put victims first', namely: the changes to call handling and case management processes, and 
the Community Trigger, which forces the authorities to review their responses to complaints 
of ASB in circumstances where victims feel they have been ignored. These particular policies 
aim to prioritise ǀiĐtiŵs͛ needs, however it is argued the new victim-focus is: diluted by 
competing Coalition ASB agendas, demonstrates little connection between rhetoric and 
reality, provides limited redress for all victims and fails to coalesce with established attempts 
to tackle perpetrators of ASB.  
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Introduction 
The evolution of anti-social behaviour (ASB) policy in England and Wales since 1998 has been 
well documented (Burney, 2005; Millie, 2009; Prior, 2009; Hodgkinson and Tilley, 2011) and 
there is no intention to cover old ground here. This paper will critically analyse two policy 
developments introduced by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government that 
reflect a shift in ASB policy emphasis to become more victim-focused. Central to these 
proposals was the desire to focus on the needs of vulnerable and/or repeat victims (Home 
Office, 2012a) and make the process of obtaining ASB sanctions quicker and easier for the 
authorities (Home Office, 2011a). The first victim-focused development relates to police 
recording practices for ASB. Developed and implemented in 2011/12, eight police forces 
undertook a pilot call handling and case management approach to public reports of ASB to 
assist the identification of vulnerable and repeat victims. The second development, the 
Community Trigger, was brought about by the ASB, Crime and Policing Act (2014). In short, 
the Community Trigger forces relevant bodies to act if victims perceive their reports of ASB 
have been ignored (Home Office, 2013a). The rationale and timing of the Coalition's victim-
focused emphasis will be explored by examining political rhetoric and empirical research to 
determine why ASB victims have recently been afforded this elevated status. The paper will 
then analyse the two victim-focused policies outlined above, paying particular attention to 
notions of vulnerability, before considering the extent to which these new strategies 
coalesce with more established attempts to curb the perpetrators of ASB incidents, with 
reference to the Troubled Families Programme. 
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Why Focus on Victims? 
New Labour's ASB agenda focused on the regulation of nuisance behaviour and a re-
moralisation of the cultures associated with socially and economically marginalised 
communities (Garrett, 2007). The ASB policy rhetoric pursued by the Coalition demonstrated 
a marked shift in emphasis from previous ASB policies and reflected two distinct themes: 
families
1
 and victims. Perhaps influential in the decision to change policy direction, was the 
potential for the Government to re-define ASB discourse, allowing the Coalition to put their 
oǁŶ ͚staŵp͛ oŶ a poliĐǇ aƌea that epitoŵised Neǁ Laďouƌ. It is clear from high-profile 
speeches that different Coalition figures took responsibility for each thematic area. Prime 
Minister David Cameron championed the family as a site for ASB intervention particularly 
through the Troubled Families Programme (Cameron, 2011a: 2011b; 2014), and Home 
Secretary Theresa May concentrated on the needs of vulnerable and/or repeat victims (May, 
2010; 2011; 2012a; 2012b). From a political perspective, it is interesting to note how the two 
primary definers of Coalition ASB policy rarely articulated each other's theme. For example, 
May did not mention troubled families in any party conference or major ASB speeches 
during the Coalition. This is in stark contrast to their predecessors Tony Blair and David 
Blunkett who worked closely together to utilise each other's symbolic capital to define New 
Labour's approach (Garrett, 2007). The policy split within the Coalition might reflect the 
cross-governmental nature of ASB, with Cameron's Troubled Families Programme based at 
the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), with May's vulnerable 
victim theme based at the Home Office. However, the practical repercussions of this appear 
to be the creation of different ASB agendas, especially considering how Cameron's focuses 
                                               
1
 Families did feature in New Labour ASB policy through, for example, the introduction of Parenting Orders and 
Family Intervention Projects (Millie, 2009), but to a much lesser extent than Coalition discourse where the 
family was promoted as a cornerstone of domestic policy-making in general (Department for Work and 
Pensions, 2014). 
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on perpetrators and May's on victims. The capacity of these different agendas to coalesce 
will be explored later through a victim-focused lens, as the focus of this paper is on the work 
of Theresa May and the Home Office due to the overarching policy shift.  
 
The Home Office's ASB victim policies were heralded by May as a response to a number of 
high-profile tragic events involving vulnerable and repeat victims. These incidents included 
the suicide of Fiona Pilkington and her disabled daughter Francecca Hardwick in 2007, 
following a sustained campaign of harassment (Independent Police Complaints Commission, 
2011a). There was also the case of David Askew, a 64-year old with learning difficulties, who 
died of a heart attack in 2010 after being bullied and harassed by young people over a ten-
year period (Independent Police Complaints Commission, 2011b). May referred to these 
incidents as 'horror stories' (May, 2012a), claiming ASB was 'destroying good people's lives' 
and generalised her comments to suggest ASB was responsible for 'millions of tarnished 
lives' (May, 2010). This victim rhetoric concentrated on 'personal' ASB (incidents targeted at 
an individual rather than a community) and demonstrates how the Coalition attempted to 
orchestrate public emotions and garner support in its bid to reform ASB, as victimisation and 
vulnerability are socially constructed for political and economic purposes (Green, 2007). 
However, instead of the victim focus constituting a responsive policy shift, a more critical 
appraisal of the policy changes might suggest that such emotive, populist policies provided 
an ideal opportunity to alleviate some of the damage caused to the Coalition parties during 
the May 2012 local elections (The Observer, 2012). Historically ASB policy has been heavily 
related to political posturing and reputation building, with Mooney and Young (2006) 
suggestiŶg that it ǁas iŶdeed Đƌeated to ďuild Neǁ Laďouƌ͛s Đƌiŵe-fighting credentials in 
light of the crime-drop. Furthermore, Squires (2006) contends tackling ASB itself was an 
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atteŵpt to Đlose the ͚justiĐe gap͛ ďǇ foĐusiŶg on enforcement action. It appears that an 
attempt at reputation building is partly responsible for the CoalitioŶ͛s ĐhaŶges to A“B poliĐǇ, 
in a similar way to their predecessors political manoeuvring (Duggan and Heap, 2013; Heap, 
2014); highlighted by the implementation date for the Community Trigger falling in October 
2014, a little over six months before the 2015 General Election. This is further underlined by 
the emotion generating focus on personal ASB as part of the victim discourse, which glosses 
over the statistics that suggest 'nuisance' ASB incidents (behaviour that causes 
trouble/annoyance to a community) are really causing the most problems as they total more 
than double the number of personal incidents and have done so on a sustained basis since 
the categorical measures were first introduced in 2011/12 (Office for National Statistics, 
2012; 2013; 2014).  
 
Politics aside, evidence from a variety of sources also suggests the profile of ASB victims 
should be raised and their experiences acknowledged. Initially it was the police that brought 
the concept of ASB victims to wider attention. The report ͚AŶti-Social Behaviour: Stop the 
‘ot͛ in 2010 by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), examined how the police 
deal with ASB and highlighted the incongruent status afforded to ASB amongst police 
officers compared to crime. It suggests that reporting practices relating to potential repeat 
aŶd/oƌ ǀulŶeƌaďle ǀiĐtiŵs ͚contributed to aŶ iŶĐƌeasiŶg aĐĐeptaŶĐe oƌ ͞defining down͟ of 
ASB that we should Ŷot haǀe gƌoǁŶ used to͛ (HMIC, 2010: 11). The report proposes a more 
proactive approach to ASB in order to remedy this, emphasising early intervention and more 
poliĐe ͚feet oŶ the stƌeet͛ ;HMIC, ϮϬϭϬ: ϳͿ. It also contends that communities have a role to 
play in tackling ASB, a topic that will be addressed later. Research evidence further supports 
the policy shift. Clarke et al. (2011) suggest how practitioners think more ought to be done 
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to meet the needs of victims and witnesses, particularly for those who are vulnerable. 
Research into victims' perspectives of ASB also indicates that victims' needs should be 
elevated. Heap (2010) found victims held negative perceptions of the authorities͛ approach 
to tackling ASB. Participants cited a lack of response to ASB reports from the authorities 
(police and social housing providers); generating a strong sentiment that reporting ASB was 
a waste of time and constrained future reports. This reiterates the work of Squires and 
Stephen (2005) who draw attention to the gap between public perceptions and enforcement 
priorities. This highlights how ǀiĐtiŵs͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐes of A“B aƌe ofteŶ ĐoŵpouŶded ďǇ 
unsatisfactory responses from the authorities.  These findings indicate that victims of ASB, 
whether vulnerable and repeat or not, require additional support through policy change, 
therefore attention will turn to the policy developments themselves to consider whether 
ǀiĐtiŵs͛ Ŷeeds aƌe ďeiŶg adeƋuatelǇ addƌessed. 
 
Recognising and Reconciling Vulnerability 
In order to ameliorate some of the concerns raised by HMIC (2010), the Home Office 
alongside the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) supported a number of call 
handling and case management trials in 2011 to better identify and protect vulnerable and 
repeat ASB victims. The inclusion of the term vulnerability in the ASB policy discourse was 
undoubtedly fuelled by the high-profile tragic cases involving vulnerable victims such as 
Pilkington and Askew. However, the focus on vulnerable victims requires further 
consideration with the notions of vulnerability and disability examined within an ASB 
context, because both practical and conceptual difficulties abound. 
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In practice, ACPO led eight forces and their partners (e.g. Community Safety Partnerships) to 
engage with five core principles to better protect vulnerable and repeat victims. These were: 
 
1) Having an effective call handling system 
2) Assessing potential risks to victims early in the call handling process 
ϯͿ UsiŶg siŵple ͚off the shelf͛ IT sǇsteŵs to shaƌe iŶfoƌŵatioŶ 
4) Having shared case management principles between all agencies 
5) Having a robust community engagement process to identify community concerns  
(Home Office, 2012b: 7) 
 
Once signed up to these principles the eight police forces utilised a ͚ďottoŵ-up͛ appƌoaĐh to 
develop a call handling and case management system considered most responsive to the 
local context. The results from these trials were considered positive (Home Office, 2012b), 
although it is difficult to proclaim their wholesale success due to the self-assessment nature 
of the findings, in contrast to a formal process and/or outcome evaluation. Despite the lack 
of a methodologically robust evidence base, Theresa May states in the forward to the report 
that ͚ouƌ aiŵ is foƌ otheƌ poliĐe foƌĐes aŶd theiƌ paƌtŶeƌs to see ǁhat has ǁoƌked iŶ pƌaĐtiĐe 
so that theǇ too ĐaŶ ĐoŶsideƌ iŶtƌoduĐiŶg a siŵilaƌ appƌoaĐh͛ ;Hoŵe OffiĐe, ϮϬϭϮď: ϯͿ. This 
sentiment is further echoed on the Home Office website, which affirms how the 
afoƌeŵeŶtioŶed ƌepoƌt ͚sets out ouƌ plaŶs to deliǀeƌ oŶ the ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to iŶtƌoduĐe ŵoƌe 
effective measures to tackle antisocial behaviour' (Home Office 2013b). However the key 
question is whether this is reflected in reality?  
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In order to assess the uptake of the call handling and case management practices, the author 
contacted the Home Office via a Freedom of Information request. According to the Home 
Office (2013c, personal communication), they do not collect information about the number 
of police forces currently using the call handling and case management practices outlined 
aďoǀe. Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, theǇ state it is Ŷot a ͚foƌŵal ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt͛ foƌ all poliĐe foƌĐes to adopt 
such practices. Therefore despite the rhetoric surrounding vulnerable and repeat victims, in 
reality there is little understanding of what is happening in practice and a clear lack of 
commitment to evaluate the impact of measures to help vulnerable and repeat ASB victims. 
These surprising findings are somewhat mitigated by figures produced by HMIC (2012), 
which show that all 43 forces have IT systems in place to identify vulnerable and repeat 
victims, with 33 forces able to do this automatically for repeat victims and 21 for vulnerable 
victims. There is also an acknowledgment that improvements in tackling ASB have been 
made since HMIC investigated the issue in 2010. However, the HMIC (2012) report also 
highlights how the call handling practices vary significantly between police force areas. For 
example, there are distinct contrasts between forces who undertook the call handling trials, 
as well as those who did not, when a sample of 100 calls was examined. Of the trial areas, 
Lincolnshire checked 75/100 calls for repeat victimisation and 30/100 for vulnerability, 
compared to South Wales who checked 25/100 and 10/100 respectively. In the remaining 
forces, Dyfed-Powys checked 82/100 for repeats and 56/100 for vulnerability in contrast to 
West Yorkshire who checked 29/100 and 18/100 respectively (HMIC, 2012). These wide 
ǀaƌiatioŶs aƌe uŶdeƌliŶed ďǇ the ƌeǀelatioŶ that ͚Ŷo foƌĐe ĐoŶsisteŶtlǇ ďolsteƌ this [the IT] 
fuŶĐtioŶalitǇ ďǇ eŶsuƌiŶg that taĐtful aŶd taƌgeted ƋuestioŶiŶg of the Đalleƌ takes plaĐe͛ 
(HMIC, 2012: 28). This may be a resources issue, particularly when considering the rural 
nature of some of the police forces mentioned above. However, this will be of little comfort 
 9 
 
to victims of ASB whose suffering is in no way diminished by their geographic location. In 
addition, research undertaken by Hopkins Burke et al. (2012) found that numerous cases of 
ASB recorded by the police could have been recorded as crime. This raises questions about 
the decline in police recorded crime and extent to which criminal incidents have been 
(in)advertently classified as ASB. These startling inconsistencies further highlight the lack of 
commitment to improving the experience of reporting ASB for all victims and demonstrate 
how reporting ASB is essentially a postcode lottery. Regardless of the issues with the 
systems in place to identify vulnerable or repeat victims, the implementation overlooks the 
complexities of vulnerability and in particular, the association between vulnerability and 
disability within Coalition ASB policy. 
 
Conceptually, the policy rhetoric appears to be re-defining ASB as a concern for the 
vulnerable, but more specifically disabled people due to the foregrounding of the high-
profile tragic cases (May, 2010; 2011; 2012a; 2012b). This politicisation of vulnerability may 
be the type of rhetoric required by the Coalition to bolster public support in light of 
swingeing budget cuts to the criminal justice system and disability benefits such as Disability 
Living Allowance (now Personal Independence Payments). Alternatively it might be seen as a 
way of addressing poor disablist hate crime conviction rates (Roulstone et al., 2011). 
However, the policy reaction to the Pilkington and Askew cases appears to conflate 
vulnerability and disability and this needs challenging. Victimologists suggest that 
vulnerability is based on personal attributes (Sparks, 1982), that encompass a range of 
internal and external aspects (Killeas, 1990). Disability could be one of these aspects and 
Garland (2012) makes the salient point that victims such as Fiona Pilkington are not 
inherently vulnerable, but in fact vulnerable to increased levels of the risk of harassment. 
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Some disabled people are disproportionally vulnerable to a greater risk of ASB 
harassment/victimisation because we know there are high numbers of disabled social 
housing tenants that also live in deprived areas (Wood and Edwards, 2005), which are both 
indicators of exposure to ASB (Nicholas et al., 2007). This shift towards protecting the 
vulnerable from ASB, particularly disabled people, could be seen as a positive change of 
perspective based on previous research as there has been a clear policy shift from 
sanctioning disabled people as perpetrators to focusing on their victim status. However, the 
policies that disproportionately sanctioned them in the first instance have not necessarily 
been remedied. For example, the British Institute for Brain Injured Children (2007) found 
that 5% of ASBOs reported by ASB Co-ordinators and 37% of ASBOs reports by Youth 
Offending Teams were given to those under the age of 17 with diagnosed mental health 
problems or accepted learning difficulties, stating these vulnerable young people were easy 
targets for the sanction. Fyson and Yates (2011) reinforce this by demonstrating a continued 
lack of awareness and understanding of learning disabilities, within the context of ASB 
practice.  
 
Nevertheless, the real disconnect in the call handling policy and wider ASB discourse is the 
link between ASB, vulnerability and the hate crime threshold. There is an astounding lack of 
clarity throughout the policy documents relating to the point at which ASB becomes a hate 
crime. This issue is further confused because of the references made to the 'targeting' of 
vulnerable victims in policy documents (Home Office, 2011a) and speeches by Theresa May 
that refer directly to the Pilkington case (2012a). ASB targeted at a victim due to the 
perpetrators hostility towards disability (such as Pilkington's daughter) should be identified 
and addressed as a hate crime under s.146 of the Criminal Justice Act (2003). Therefore, 
 11 
 
whilst the Pilkington case is held up as the type of ASB incident not to be repeated, it should 
in fact not have been considered as ASB at all and this is a fundamental flaw of the victim-
focused ASB policy. This is particularly pertinent because the Criminal Justice Joint Inspection 
Review (2013) specifically examined disablist hate crime and proposed that changes need to 
be made around how the police and Crown Prosecution Service identify and record these 
incidents, with the follow-up report still insisting there is work to be done in this area 
(Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2015). However, this situation is further complicated by 
the way the law constructs disablist hate crime as something different from crime (or ASB) 
targeted at those perceived to be vulnerable (Roulstone et al., 2011). Therefore if a victim is 
targeted because they are perceived to be vulnerable, which they may be as a result of their 
disability the behaviour is classed ASB, whereas if the victim is targeted due to the offender 
being prejudiced against disabled people it is hate crime. It appears the subjective and 
perceptions-based definitions of ASB, vulnerability, disability and hate crime have been 
drawn together by their shared blurred boundaries and are further complicated by the 
suggestion that vulnerability and hate are not mutually exclusive (Roulstone and Sadique 
2013). This compounds the practical difficulties mentioned earlier, making cases extremely 
difficult to accurately identify and for an effective response to be delivered, with issues for 
crime data manipulation and the accuracy of statistics. These problems have not been 
adequately addressed by the policy discourse and could still lead to victims falling through 
the gap between ASB and hate crime provision in a similar way to Pilkington, especially as it 
relies on the victim's perception of the incident. The statutory guidance document for the 
new ASB powers produced by the Home Office (2014) briefly mentions hate crime, but does 
not use the terminology 'hate incident', which relates to non-criminal hate motivated 
behaviours (Crown Prosecution Service, 2007), which is where the overlap with ASB lies. By 
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neglecting to recognise hate-motivated incidents and retaining these incidents within the 
jurisdiction of ASB legislation, the seriousness of this victimisation is over-looked and down-
graded because the meaning of 'anti-social' is very different to 'hate' (Duggan and Heap, 
2013). Failure to use the term 'hate incident' therefore contradicts the increased emphasis 
and support proffered to vulnerable victims and retains the silos between ASB and hate 
crime. Those charged with identifying and recording ASB and hate crime need to adopt a 
shared terminology to recognise the overlap and better serve vulnerable victims, including 
all victims with the protected identity characteristics set out in s.146. It is interesting 
politically, as well as disappointing practically, that none of the other protected 
characteristics have been given the same high profile as disability in the ASB discourse, 
especially because research that shows Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) groups for example, 
are more likely to perceive
2
 higher levels of ASB (Nicholas et al., 2007). Chakraborti and 
Garland (2012) argue the interpretation of hate crime should be widened to include 
vulnerability and this suggestion should be considered in light of ASB policy too. Donoghue 
(2013) also suggests victim engagement is necessary to develop risk assessment practices 
and shape professionals' understanding of vulnerability. However this may only capture the 
views of victims with the capital to engage in such debates, which may dilute its practical 
value for many vulnerable victims. At this juncture it is also important to remember that ASB 
is not a concern of the vulnerable alone (whilst acknowledging that vulnerable victims may 
be less equipped to counteract their victimisation). Other tragic high-profile victims could 
not be classified as vulnerable or repeat. For example Garry Newlove, was murdered in 2007 
following an altercation with a group of alcohol-intoxicated young people he suspected had 
                                               
2
 Due to definitional and counting issues, the British Crime Survey used perceptions of ASB as a proxy measure 
for experience between 2003 and 2011. From 2012 the Crime Survey for England and Wales has provided ASB 
incident data, but this does highlight the experiences of different demographic groups.  
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vaŶdalised his ǁife͛s Đaƌ ;The Guardian, 2007) and in 2011 Dr Suzanne Dow committed 
suicide after suffering months of harassment from her neighbours despite numerous 
attempts to seek help from the authorities (The Telegraph, 2013). These cases underline 
hoǁ the authoƌities͛ ƌespoŶse to all victims of ASB should be improved, in terms of 
identification and action.  
 
The issues with the call handling and case management trials, the conceptualisation of 
vulnerability and the treatment of all victims are mitigated by wider policy issues. The other 
aspect raised by the initial HMIC report in 2010 relating to improving the handling of ASB 
reports, was puttiŶg ͚feet oŶ the stƌeet͛. If the Đall haŶdliŶg aŶd Đase ŵaŶageŵeŶt sǇsteŵs 
are not meeting the needs of victims, frontline police officers could be potentially fill this 
gap. It appears not. The House of Commons Library (2013) details that police officer 
strength
3
 is currently at the lowest recorded level since 2002 (although it still remains high in 
historical terms during a period of falling crime). The National Audit Office (2015) reports a 
25% reduction in police funding throughout the duration of the Coalition, with a reduction in 
the size of the police workforce by 36,672. This is the reality of the 23% cuts made to the 
Home Office budget by 2015, which Theresa May detailed at the National Conservative 
Convention in 2013, coupled with the announcement that since coming to power the 
Coalition have overseen reductions in crime of over 10% (May, 2013). However, it is clear 
from the evidence produced above that victims of ASB, be they vulnerable, repeat, both or 
none of those categories; are still not receiving a consistent level of service from the police, 
with reductions in recorded crime potentially attributable to some crimes being classified as 
ASB. 
                                               
3
 Police officer strength represents the number of full-time equivalent police officers. 
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There are evidently problems with the police delivering effective changes to reporting 
practices, despite commitments from the Home Office and HMIC to prioritise such 
developments. This is particularly ironic considering the latter were so critical of the delays 
and unreactive nature of partnership approaches to tackling ASB in their original report 
(HMIC, 2010). Therefore it is perhaps conceivable that some of the difficulties associated 
with recording practices stem from them being too heavily police-led. Heap (2010) found 
that despite most reports of ASB being made to the police, there were a large number of 
instances where victims reported ASB to local authorities and social housing providers. 
Therefore by focusing on the reporting mechanisms of the police, the experience and victim 
status (vulnerable or repeat) is not under such scrutiny in other areas, creating the possibility 
of inconsistencies in responses to reports of ASB, dependent on which agency the incident is 
reported to. The variance in reporting ASB is not a new issue (Wood, 2004; Heap, 2010), but 
it feeds into the disparity of service received by victims. Although well-meaning, the 
consequence of the creation of a knee-jerk policy response such as the focus on vulnerability 
is that it often over-simplifies the problem and signifies a purely performative political 
gesture. This has occurred here due to the particularly complex framework of ASB and 
appears to have made matters more complicated. 
 
Victims Triggering Responses 
As part of the ASB, Crime and Policing Act (2014) the Community Trigger forces relevant 
bodies, such as the police or local authority, to review the responses they have made to 
complaints of ASB. The caveat for a review of ASB complaints being granted is that the 
relevant bodies must agree whether a reporting threshold has been met. In the initial 
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consultation document, this threshold was set at five individual complaints from five 
different households, or three complaints from an individual about the same issue in the 
same neighbourhood in the last six months where no action had been taken (Home Office, 
2011a). However by the time the White Paper had been produced in 2012, these national 
thresholds had been removed in favour of locally produced criteria to ͚suit loĐal 
ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes aŶd foĐus oŶ loĐal pƌioƌities͛ ;Hoŵe OffiĐe, ϮϬϭϮa: ϭϮͿ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, the pƌoďleŵ 
with this approach is ensuring a suitable threshold is locally agreed. It is unclear how this 
should, and will, be deliberated and formulated in practice. For instance, it seems logical 
that the more ASB an area suffers from the higher the threshold of the Trigger should be, 
because more resources will be in place to deal with the behaviour in the first place. 
However, the greater the amount of ASB and associated resources/personnel involved 
increases the likelihood that a case may be mismanaged, which indicates the necessity for a 
lower Trigger threshold. Equally, an area with fewer incidents of ASB could have a lower 
Trigger threshold to reflect the rarity of the incidents (and perhaps decreased tolerance of 
ASB from the residents). Alternatively it could be aligned to public perceptions of ASB (which 
prior to 2011 was the national means for measuring ASB before incident counting). However 
the Trigger threshold is fashioned, the fundamental problem is that it is unfair that in one 
location three complaints is enough to Trigger a response by the relevant bodies whereas in 
another location it is five, particularly when there is no accounting for the severity of the 
incidents or the vulnerability of the victim. This may simply be an inevitable consequence of 
Conservative-driven localism, which removes their responsibility for delivery. Nevertheless, 
it does Ŷot seeŵ ƌight that oŶe peƌsoŶ͛s eǆpeƌieŶĐes of A“B Đan remain untended because 
they have not reached a crudely constructed threshold, simply because they are not 
considered to be enough of a victim. A further aspect of location to consider is rurality. With 
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the Trigger being agreed at force level, both urban and rural communities will be served by 
the same threshold. This reinforces the potential for additional local disparities for victims, 
because based on the premise that deprived urban areas suffer from relatively more ASB 
(Flatley et al., 2008), incidents in rural locations may have a greater impact on quality of life.  
 
The acknowledgement of ongoing victimisation and the subsequent measures put in place to 
manage cases more efficiently is effectively an attempt to make the victimisation experience 
ŵoƌe pleasaŶt, akiŶ to a ƌaŶge of ͚Đustoŵeƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐe͛ tǇpe ŵeasuƌes ;Duggan and Heap, 
2014). This is a purely reactive policy that only operates once multiple incidents of ASB 
victimisation have occurred. It assumes victimisation is inevitable, particularly as there has 
been little investment in any type of primary ASB prevention, and therefore contradicts the 
Coalition's assertion to put victims first. Essentially this power should not have to exist. Every 
complaint should receive a response, but failures by the authorities particularly relating to 
vulnerable and repeat victims, has prompted its introduction and the realities of it 
functioning in practice must be addressed. By focusing on vulnerable victims, as well as 
introducing arbitrary measures around the threshold, the Coalition has created a new 
hierarchy of victimisation. The damaging consequence of this approach is labelling one 
victim as more deserving than another and it can be seen how certain victims are 
demarcated (vulnerable and repeat victims), prioritised (as per the call handling changes) 
and responsibilised (charged with activating the Community Trigger if their complaints have 
not been satisfactorily addressed) (Duggan and Heap, 2014). It can be successfully argued 
that vulnerable victims of ASB need more support as they may suffer more harm as a 
consequence of their victimisation (Green, 2007), but this should not be provided at the 
expense and inequality of others and should certainly not embroil victims in an additional 
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layer of criminal justice bureaucracy. The potential for an unbalanced provision for victims 
did not go unnoticed and was highlighted by the Home Affairs Select Committee (2013), who 
suggested that a national (entirely arbitrary) maximum of five complaints was a necessary 
backstop for these proposals. Already in the pilot project, four different areas implemented 
three different threshold levels (Home Office, 2013d). However, this issue was not 
considered serious enough for revision in the ASB, Crime and Policing Bill during its passage 
through Parliament. The pilot projects generally reported positive findings (Home Office, 
2013d), however these self-assessed appraisals (similar to the call handling and case 
management trials detailed above) do little to assert the external and ecological validity of 
the findings and whether these policies can be effectively generalised and transferred into 
practice on a national scale. 
 
There are further problems with the Community Trigger. It is unclear how the threshold will 
be communicated to the public and more importantly, how it will be communicated to 
vulnerable victims to ensure they are able to take advantage of it. This aspect is crucial if the 
powers are to translate effectively into practice and could be hampered due to a lack of 
additional funds being allocated to facilitate the implementation of the new legislation (HC 
Deb 2013-14). Even if victims are aware of the new power, it is potentially problematic in 
areas where residents are too afraid to report ASB and cannot achieve the necessary 
number of complaints to meet the threshold. Conversely, it is also theoretically open to 
manipulation by persistent complainers. For example, when there is a less serious complaint 
of ASB where the victim is more vocal, an individual could technically make the required 
number of complaints simply to provoke enforcement action. It seems a real possibility that 
the authorities' resources attached to the Community Trigger could be busy responding to 
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those who shout the loudest about relatively trivial issues, to the detriment of the 
vulnerable and repeat victims the Coalition is so keen to support. The Community Trigger 
has highlighted the role of the community in tackling ASB. The community has been 
responsibilised as a site for action against ASB, in the sense that to spark the Trigger the 
community must play their part through meeting the threshold for review by reporting ASB 
the prerequisite number of times. This approach is similar to the narrative espoused by the 
White Paper Respect and Responsibility - Taking a Stand Against Anti-Social Behaviour 
(Home Office, 2003). However, this idealised view does not necessarily empower 
communities, failing to take account of the general loss of public confidence in the statutory 
crime control agencies as well as the development of dismissive attitudes towards the police 
which creates a culture of non-reporting (Casey and Flint, 2007) and fear (Heap, 2010). This 
is notwithstanding communities that have always lacked trust in the police (Evans, 2010). In 
addition to increased co-operation with the police, greater displays of informal social control 
haǀe ďeeŶ Đalled foƌ ďǇ the HMIC ;ϮϬϭϬ: ϭϭͿ ƌepoƌt that states: ͞iŶdiǀiduals aŶd ĐoŵŵuŶities 
must mobilise their defences by re-establishing acceptable rules of behaviours for those in 
puďliĐ spaĐes͟. “iŵilaƌlǇ, ‘ogeƌs ;ϮϬϭϬͿ suggests people should be trained in basic 
community safety skills to diffuse conflicts associated with ASB, in a similar way to how 
people are trained in first aid. If a community has been suffering from ASB for a prolonged 
period of time without adequate assistance from the authorities, they are unlikely to be able 
to ͚ŵoďilise theiƌ defeŶĐes͛, take oǁŶeƌship oƌ iŶteƌǀeŶe ǁheŶ theǇ aƌe too afƌaid to eǀen 
report incidents (Heap, 2010; Duggan and Heap, 2014). Such suggestions are unworkable 
within the current ASB policy framework, particularly amid broader public sector spending 
cuts associated with the Coalition government. A more realistic solution would be to locate 
some middle-ground between formal and informal modes of social control to determine 
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whether greater community responsibilisation would work where the community is 
fragmented and with low engagement and participation, as the above proposals favour 
stable, middle class communities which are more likely to take action (Hancock, 2006). 
 
An additional dimension to consider aside from the threshold itself is the idea that the 
Tƌiggeƌ ǁill Đoŵe iŶto effeĐt ǁheŶ ͚Ŷo aĐtioŶ has ďeeŶ takeŶ͛. It is uŶĐleaƌ ǁhat this ŵeaŶs 
in practice. If this really does mean no action at all in terms of a response from the 
authorities, the Pilkington case would have not met the criteria for the Community Trigger 
because action had been taken by the police, albeit unsatisfactorily. This precipitates the 
ƋuestioŶ of ǁhetheƌ ͚Ŷo aĐtioŶ͛ is ďased oŶ the peƌĐeptioŶ of the victim, if they feel the 
response has been unsatisfactory and the problem not resolved, or whether this is solely 
down to the discretion of the authorities. Greater clarification of this aspect is required, 
particularly for victims who wish to utilise the Trigger and especially those who may be 
vulnerable enough to not understand the complexities of this legislation, such as those with 
poor English language skills, mental health problems and/or learning difficulties. 
 
A final point to contemplate is how this policy coalesces with other policies aimed at tackling 
perpetrators of ASB. It has specific implications for the performance measures associated 
with the Troubled Families Programme, of which reducing ASB is a key component. The 
Troubled Families Pƌogƌaŵŵe is the CoalitioŶ͛s ǀeƌsioŶ of Neǁ Laďouƌ͛s FaŵilǇ IŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ 
Programme. It was initiated by David Cameron after the English riots of 2011 and embodies 
his ASB rhetorical focus on families (Cameron, 2011a: 2011b; 2014) (as opposed to Theresa 
May's foĐus oŶ ǀiĐtiŵsͿ. The pƌogƌaŵŵe ǁoƌks ǁith faŵilies ǁho ͞aƌe iŶǀolǀed iŶ Đƌiŵe aŶd 
anti-social behaviour, have children not in school, have an adult on out of work benefits 
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[aŶd] Đause high Đosts to the puďliĐ puƌse͟ ;DCLG, 2012: 3). This scheme operates under the 
remit of payment by results, with local authorities receiving payment subsequent to a 60% 
reduction in recorded ASB incidents across the family within the past six months (DCLG, 
2012). By having a threshold value, the Community Trigger incentivises ASB reporting, 
theƌefoƌe poteŶtiallǇ affeĐts ǁhetheƌ a ϲϬ% ƌeduĐtioŶ iŶ A“B ďǇ the ͚tƌouďled faŵilǇ͛ ĐaŶ ďe 
achieved, leading to the possible gaming of figures and a pressure not to record. As a result 
of this paradox, the two policies are effectively competing against each other, with victim 
success in one (the review of the response) affecting failure in another (greater reports and 
non-payment). The potential impact of the Community Trigger on the Troubled Families 
Programme could lead to Local Authorities not being paid for the work they have already 
undertaken. Consequently any funding deficit could be recouped from wider crime reduction 
budgets, which may lead to increases in crime and act as a disincentive to work with 
troubled families long-term. This policy disconnect highlights fractures between Cameron 
and May's different ASB discourses and how their personal policy foci have not been 
effectively considered in tandem. This oversight also fails to acknowledge the potential 
intersection between victims and perpetrators, so whilst vulnerable victims are being 
prioritised they may be simultaneously under scrutiny as part of the Troubled Families 
Programme.  This drags the victim-focused policies into the highly contested, extensively 
debated idea that ASB policy acts as a vehicle for governing the poor and marginalised (Carr 
and Cowan, 2006; Tyler, 2013), much of which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
drawing ASB victims into the politics of the socially marginalised further burdens them with 
the class-based dogma advocated by the Coalition. This was epitomised by the 'striver versus 
skiver' rhetoric, which champions 'hard-working families' and discredits those out of work 
and receiving benefits (The Guardian 2013; Cameron, 2014). Such social divisions have been 
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reinforced by a media discourse that uses the derogatory term chav to caricature negative 
traits associated with the working class such as violence, fecklessness, delinquency and 
laziness (Jones, 2011). Indeed, Tyler (2013) suggests how the term chav signifies class 
struggle within neoliberal society. Valentine and Harris (2014: 91) extend this assertion by 
reporting how contemporary class-based prejudice has become pervasive within working-
class communities, with 'growing social antagonisms about who has the right to make claims 
on the state'. These findings are reinforced on a larger-scale by the British Social Attitudes 
Survey, which has shown attitudes towards working-aged benefits claimants are hardening 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2015). This highlights how victims of ASB may also be vulnerable due to their 
social class, as well as any other protected identity characteristics mentioned previously. 
 
Fundamentally, the rationale behind the Community Trigger is to prevent another tragedy 
such as the Pilkington case. However, this policy creates numerous ethical and practical 
tensions, which demonstrate a lack of foresight and bring into question the overall efficacy 
of the proposals. 
 
 Conclusion 
The Coalition has attempted to create its own version of ASB policy by pursuing a route 
ǁheƌe ǀiĐtiŵs͛ Ŷeeds aƌe pƌioƌitised. By deconstructing changes to police call handling and 
case management and the Community Trigger this paper has suggested how these 
developments have been poorly conceived and are fundamentally flawed. The call handling 
and case management changes have been shown to be inconsistently implemented on a 
national scale, thus creating a postcode lottery for victims in terms of how their complaint is 
managed, particularly those who are vulnerable and/or repeat. Under scrutiny, the 
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Community Trigger generates numerous questions about the value placed on ASB 
victimisation for different groups of people, with the potential to create a hierarchy of 
victims based on factors such as vulnerability and residential location. The inconsistencies 
between both of the policies appear to have been fuelled by competing ASB agendas from 
those at the top of the Coalition government, with May focusing on the needs of vulnerable 
victims and Cameron on perpetrators. Despite both delivering salient political rhetoric, the 
lack of communication appears to limit the level of redress available to victims when 
considered in practice, which undermines the intended victims focus.  
 
Victims of ASB would be better served by policies that aim to prevent ASB victimisation in 
the first instance for all types of victims, thus avoiding a concentration on retrospective 
justice. This could be achieved by increasing opportunities for education, recreation and 
building community cohesion. Further training for frontline officers and call handlers on a 
national scale would assist the identification of vulnerable and/or repeat victims, could 
include emphasising the differences between ASB and hate crime, and promote a shared 
terminology around hate incidents. These suggestions may not provide vote-winning sound 
bites, quick results or be cheap to implement, but they are examples of truly putting victims 
first. 
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